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Image data analysis techniques such as facial recognition can threaten
individuals’ privacy. Whereas privacy risks often can be reduced by
adding noise to the data, this approach reduces the utility of the im-
ages. For this reason, image de-identification techniques typically
replace directly identifying features (e.g., faces, car number plates)
present in the data with synthesized features, while still preserving
other non-identifying features. As of today, existing techniques
mostly focus on improving the naturalness of the generated syn-
thesized images, without quantifying their impact on privacy. In
this paper, we propose the first methodology and system design
to quantify, improve, and tune the privacy-utility trade-off, while
simultaneously also improving the naturalness of the generated
images. The system design is broken down into three components
that address separate but complementing challenges. This includes
a two-step cluster analysis component to extract low-dimensional
feature vectors representing the images (embedding) and to cluster
the images into fixed-sized clusters. While the importance of good
clustering mostly has been neglected in previous work, we find that
our novel approach of using low-dimensional feature vectors can
improve the privacy-utility trade-off by better clustering similar
images. The use of these embeddings has been found particularly
useful when wanting to ensure high naturalness and utility of the
synthetically generated images. By combining improved clustering
and incorporating StyleGAN, a state-of-the-art Generative Neural
Network, into our solution, we produce more realistic synthesized
faces than prior works, while also better preserving properties such
as age, gender, skin tone, or even emotional expressions. Finally,
our iterative tuning method exploits non-linear relations between
privacy and utility to identify good privacy-utility trade-offs. We
note that an example benefit of these improvements is that our so-
lution allows car manufacturers to train their autonomous vehicles
while complying with privacy laws.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an enormous increase in the produc-
tion of video and image data. Widespread use of handheld devices
(e.g., smartphones, tablets, digital cameras), surveillance devices
(e.g., security cameras), and many other factors have contributed
to this global trend. Moreover, recent technologies such as self-
driving vehicles rely heavily on machine learning technologies
being applied on the captured image and video data to operate
autonomously, enhance driving performance, user experiences, or
to in other ways make our lives easier. In these usage scenarios, the
captured data is analyzed with respect to demographic attributes
of the depicted people.
Image and video data, however, are highly privacy-sensitive
as they contain biometric or uniquely identifying information of
individuals (data subjects). To analyze or share such data while
complying with laws such as the GDPR [5], the data owner (e.g.,
the car manufacturer) or data controller (e.g., the data analysts)
need to remove information from the data to de-identify the data
subjects. To achieve this goal, de-identification techniques gener-
ally try to remove identity-related information in such a way that
not only humans but also machines cannot recognize the iden-
tity of any individual present in the data. Furthermore, due to its
critical role in analyzing data from the aforementioned emerging
technologies (e.g., training self-driving cars to detect and better
interact with pedestrians), it is becoming increasingly important
to preserve as much as possible of the utility of original data in
the de-identified data. Ideally, the resulting datasets should also
have similar properties as the original dataset (e.g., distributions
of attributes such as age, gender, skin tone, or even emotional ex-
pression should be preserved), generated faces should look natural,
and the methodology should be generally applicable for different
datasets, without restrictions on how faces are depicted, and allow
for easy addition/removal of images.
Session 3: PETS in the Wild WPES '20, November 9, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
87
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.
Some of the most popular image de-identification techniques are
from the 𝑘-same [22] family. The idea of 𝑘-same de-identification
is based on the 𝑘-anonymity [32] scheme for categorical data, that
turns identifiability of individuals into one of a set of 𝑘 individuals.
Generally, 𝑘-anonymity based image de-identification techniques
first cluster 𝑘 similar images, then generate a synthesized image
by combining the 𝑘 images from the cluster and, finally, replace
each image in the cluster with the same synthesized image. Thus,
the privacy and the utility provided by the 𝑘-anonymity based
de-identification techniques are highly dependent on the value 𝑘 .
However, the 𝑘-anonymity based de-identification techniques do
not specify how to choose 𝑘 . Another key factor that has a great
impact on the privacy and utility provided is how well we cluster
similar images. To increase the utility (decrease the information
loss), it is important to cluster similar images into one cluster. When
using 𝑘-anonymity schemes, typically all such clusters have the
same number of elements (i.e., 𝑘). While such fixed-size clusters
adhere to the privacy bound 1/𝑘 , no prior work has provided tech-
niques to cluster similar images into fixed-size clusters in a way
that takes information loss into account or made use of machine-
learning-based embedding techniques such as those used here to
improve the clustering. In this paper, we introduce a framework ca-
pable of reducing the information loss and tuning the privacy-utility
trade-off for a given dataset. To evaluate the utility of different de-
identification techniques and the relative value of applying different
functions within the different modules of our system design, we
present example evaluations on two public datasets. To evaluate
the utility in terms of information loss, we measure the average
Euclidean distances between each image in a cluster and the corre-
sponding synthesized image for that cluster. Furthermore, we study
the privacy-utility trade-off, by varying the size of the clusters gen-
erated (i.e., 𝑘) and calculating the total information loss for each
cluster size. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we demonstrate
how access to this trade-off (as provided for the first time by our
framework) yields insights and helps us determine the best 𝑘 value,
given a set of specific privacy and utility requirements.
Our Contribution. In summary, our main contributions are:
• Methodology, conceptual framework, and metrics for quanti-
fying the privacy-utility trade-off. Our solutions are applied
and evaluated on two datasets.
• A solution framework that improves the overall privacy-
utility trade-off by increasing utility unilaterally with own
algorithms (clustering), novel utilization of tools developed
for a different purpose (embedding), and use of a suitable
off-the-shelf tools (synthetic-face generation).
• A methodology for tuning the privacy-utility trade-off by
exploiting non-linear relations where increases in privacy
(𝑘 in 𝑘-anonymity) result in little loss of utility.
Overall, the framework is shown to provide desirable security prop-
erties (k-anonymity and facial recognition resistance), while im-
proving several efficacy properties (e.g., utility, naturalness, and
generality) compared to related works.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
first review the history and state of the art of image de-identification
in Section 2. We then present AnonFACES in Section 3, including
the desired properties, the conceptual framework, and detailed de-
scriptions of the instantiated components of the framework. We
evaluate the performance and security in Sections 4 and 5 respec-
tively, followed by our conclusions in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
The early data anonymization research mostly focused on pro-
tecting privacy of categorical data which produced multiple well-
known data de-identification techniques. One such technique for
de-identifying entries in a relational database was proposed by
Sweeney and termed as𝑘-anonymity [32]. Building on𝑘-anonymity,
there are other data anonymization techniques for categorical data
proposed in the literature: among those 𝑙-diversity [21] and 𝑡-
closeness [16] are the two most popular.
The early face de-identification approaches started with ad-hoc
techniques such as black box, blurring, and pixelation [27]. Even
though ad-hoc techniques can prevent humans from reidentifica-
tion of a subject in a de-identified image, they fail to preserve the
utility present in the data and are not robust enough to fool the
recognition systems [24]. To overcome these issues, the research
then shifted towards techniques with provable privacy guarantees.
Since differential-privacy techniques share the problems of blur-
ring and pixelation, the focus has been on 𝑘-anonymity. Newton
et al. [24] first proposed the original 𝑘-same algorithm based on
the 𝑘-anonymity model. The original 𝑘-same algorithm had limita-
tions in terms of the naturalness of the synthesized images and also
in terms of information loss during the de-identification process.
Many improvements of the original 𝑘-same algorithm have been
proposed to overcome these limitations including 𝑘-Same-Select
[9], 𝑘-Same-M [10], 𝑘-same-furthest [23], and 𝑘-Diff-furthest [31],
to name a few. These techniques either use Active Appearance
Model (AAM) or Principle Component Analysis (PCA) to construct
and preserve the different facial attributes such as age or gender.
The de-identified images produced by 𝑘-same based approaches
discussed previously lack naturalness. Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs) are recent generativemodels that can produce natural-
looking synthesized images of any given object using adversarial
training. This idea was first proposed by Goodfellow et al. in [8].
The synthesized images produced by GANs are also visually con-
vincing for the human eye. Since GANs are capable of producing
natural-looking synthesized images, they are well suited for de-
identification. As a result, multiple works proposed GAN-based
image de-identification techniques. One such technique is Privacy-
Protective-GAN (PP-GAN) proposed by Wu et al. [34]. PP-GAN is
designed for face de-identification by adapting GAN with novel
verificator and regulator modules. It is capable of retaining struc-
ture similarity in the de-identified output based on a single input.
Similarly, AnonymousNet [17] extracts facial features for structure
but adds noise for GAN-generated images.
𝑘-same-Net proposed by Meden et al. [22] is another image de-
identification scheme that aims to combine the 𝑘-same algorithm
with a GAN. Similarly, 𝑘-Same-Siamese-GAN proposed by Pan et
al. [26] is also a GAN based de-identification scheme that com-
bines 𝑘-anonymity, GAN, and hyperparameter tuning methods to
efficiently train the GAN networks and de-identify images with
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Figure 1: Overview of system model
provable privacy guarantees. Nevertheless, there are still limita-
tions in the GANs used by these techniques. For example, while
the 𝑘-Same-Siamese-GAN and PP-GAN still lack in naturalness,
𝑘-same-Net needs to be re-trained for every new image dataset,
which is inefficient for practical use cases.
None of the related works provide the quantification andmethod-
ology needed to find good values for 𝑘 in terms of the privacy-utility
trade-off. Due in part to the concrete instantiations for different
functions such as clustering and synthetic-face generation, they
have lower utility, naturalness, and generality than AnonFACES.
3 ANONFACES COMPONENTS
In this section, we introduce our proposed methodology and system
implementation, AnonFACES, to quantify, improve and tune the
privacy-utility trade-off in image de-identification. We first identify
the desired properties of such a system, and then, after a high-level
system overview, explain how AnonFACES is designed to achieve
these properties.
3.1 Desirable System Properties
We categorize the desired properties according to whether they
relate to security (S) or efficacy (E).
S1: 𝑘-anonymity. Increased 𝑘 means a larger anonymity set
and, thus, more privacy.
S2: Facial recognition resistance. Synthesized faces should
not match identified faces from the original dataset, and vice
versa.
E1: Utility . Non-identifying attributes should be preserved
for accuracy of analysis. To generalize to analysis-agnostic
cases, the information loss should be low.
E2: Naturalness. Synthesized faces should look like actual
faces.
E3: Generality. The methodology should work for different
datasets, without restrictions on how faces are depicted (e.g.,
angles), allow for addition and removal of images, and for
different instantiations of functional components.
3.2 System Overview
Our proposed model (Figure 1) consists of the following three main
components.
Cluster analysis. The challenge is to generate fixed-size clus-
ters for 𝑘-anonymity and at the same time minimize the
information loss. To do so, we divide the process into two
steps: extraction of low-dimensional feature vectors that rep-
resent the images (embedding), and fixed-size clustering
based on these feature vectors.
Synthesizing faces. For synthesizing one face from the 𝑘 im-
ages in a cluster, the first step is identity mixing. The re-
sulting vector then is input for the image generation. The
synthesized image is tested with facial recognition for risk
assessment of re-identification, with weight adaptation for
the identity mixing if need be.
Tuning. Different cluster sizes (𝑘 values) are evaluated for
their associated information loss, to inform the output
selection of good values for 𝑘 and the corresponding syn-
thesized faces for each cluster. We define the information
loss for a set of de-identified images according to Def. 3.2.
Each of the modules that perform the functions provided by the
components can be instantiated in various ways. We describe the
different modules and promising instantiations in more detail in
the following subsections.
3.3 Cluster Analysis
3.3.1 Definitions. For completeness, we provide, in this section,
some definitions necessary to follow our work. First, a person-
specific dataset is presented below based on the definition suggested
by Newton et al. [24].
Definition 3.1 (Person-specific dataset). LetH be a dataset con-
taining𝑀 images, i.e., {H1, . . . ,HM}. Then, H is a person-specific
dataset if and only if (i) each image {Hi}𝑖∈[𝑀 ] ∈ H relates to only
one person and (ii) no two images Hi,Hj, ∈ H , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 relate to the
same person.
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From now on in this paper, if we do not specify otherwise, the
term dataset we use is person-specific dataset. To formalize our
utility metric, we shall need the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (Information Loss). Let ®I1, . . . , ®IN and ®D1, . . . , ®DN
be the sets of the vector representation of the original images and
corresponding de-identified images with ®Im = (im1 , . . . , imp ) and
®Dm = (dm1 , . . . , dmp ), where m ∈ [𝑁 ] and p is the vectors’ dimen-
sion. Then, we define information loss to be the average pair-wise
Euclidean distance of the de-identified images to original images.







(iml − dml )
2
𝑁
3.3.2 Embedding. The goal here is to compress the original im-
age database into condensed and lightweight embeddings which
can improve clustering. For embedding, we base our idea on the
deep-similarly metric for facial images, which achieves a high level
of precision as shown in recent works [11, 30, 33]. In contrast to
the related research, which mostly use dimensionality reduction
techniques such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or Lin-
ear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), in AnonFACES, we use Convo-
lutional Neural Network(CNN) based techniques for embedding.
Dimensionality reduction techniques are generic techniques for
representing high dimensional data into low dimensional space and
are not tailored for clustering similar identities, whereas the CNN
based embedding techniques are designed for that specific purpose.
The embeddings extracted using CNN not only provide insights
into the structure of the input dataset but also can help reducing
information loss of de-identification.
Two such face embedding techniques are Dlib [14] and FaceNet
[30]. They are trained to generate embeddings in such a way that
the distance between embeddings of the same identity or similar
identities is small and that between different identities is large. Even
though we use these face embedding techniques for a different but
related purpose, our experiments show that by using the embed-
dings generated by these techniques it is possible to instead cluster
images of different identities who have similar features (e.g., age,
gender) into one cluster.
3.3.3 Clustering. The goal of the clustering module is to cluster
similar images into fixed-size clusters and the existing state-of-the-
art clustering techniques are not tailored to do so. Thus, we need to
define the clustering criteria and what is clustering accuracy for our
work. Our clustering criteria are based on the deep similarity metric
where it is expected that given the embeddings, the clustering
algorithm should find equivalence classes in which the members in
a cluster should have the smallest possible pair-wise distance.
• Evaluation Metric. We evaluate the clustering based on a)
Pair-wise distance: min, average, and max distance; b) Mean
Silhouette scores. While the former provides a view on how
pair-wise distances between faces are distributed, the latter
measures the coherence and separation of clusters [28].
• Size Constraint on Clustering. To ensure that all the clus-
ters adhere to 𝑘-anonymity, we need to generate clusters in
such a way that each cluster contains at least 𝑘 elements. In
Algorithm 1: Hierarchical partitioning
Input: 𝑆 : input dataset with 𝑛 records, 𝑘 : size constraint,
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 : linkage criteria
Output: 𝐶: set of clusters (where size of each cluster ≥ 𝑘)
1 𝑚 = ⌊𝑛/𝑘⌋ : number of clusters
2 𝐾 = {𝑘1, 𝑘2, ..., 𝑘𝑚}, where 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘 + 1 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ (𝑛 mod𝑚),
and 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘 for (𝑛 mod𝑚) < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚
3 𝑍 = 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑆, 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘): Hierarchical tree based on pair-wise
distance
4 for 𝑗 = 1 to𝑚 do
5 𝑞 = ∅
6 while |𝑞 | ≤ 𝑘 𝑗 do
7 𝑇 = 𝑐𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 (𝑍,𝑚): Cut the tree into𝑚 clusters
8 𝑞 = max(𝑇 ): Sub-tree with the biggest size in T
9 𝑞 = {𝑞1, 𝑞2, ..., 𝑞𝑘 }: Select the lowest 𝑘 members in
the sub-tree
10 𝑚 =𝑚 − 1
11 𝑍 = 𝑍 − 𝑞: Update the tree
12 𝑚 = ⌊|𝑍 |/𝑘⌋ : Update number of clusters
13 𝐶 = 𝐶 ∪ 𝑞
14 return 𝐶
the case of images, it makes sure that at least 𝑘 facial images
are chosen for generating a synthesized face.
• Hierarchical Partitioning. Since there is no existing clus-
tering technique to cluster similar images into fixed-size
clusters based on the deep similarity metric, we developed
our own algorithm. As the embeddings are optimized for
comparing pair-wise distance between faces, building a hi-
erarchical tree based on distance matrix is a natural choice.
Based on this notion, in our algorithm, we build a hierarchi-
cal tree and cut the tree at different thresholds until we find
a cluster with at least 𝑘 members. To ensure that each cluster
has at least 𝑘 members, each cluster is pre-assigned a cluster
size. In default mode, all clusters are assigned either a size 𝑘
or 𝑘 + 1 (when 𝑛 is not evenly divided by 𝑘). The algorithm
for this approach is described in Algorithm 1. There are four
different linkage criteria one can choose for the hierarchical
tree. In particular, considering we are clustering two clusters
𝐶0 and 𝐶1, where the pair-wise distance between the two
data points is 𝛿𝑖 𝑗 = |𝑃𝑖−𝑃 𝑗 | such as 𝑃𝑖 ∈ 𝐶0 and 𝑃 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶1, then
the single linkage is defined as min(𝛿𝑖 𝑗 ) the complete linkage
is max(𝛿𝑖 𝑗 ) (∀𝑃𝑖 ∈ 𝐶0 and ∀𝑃 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶1). In their simplest form,
the average linkage is
∑
𝛿𝑖 𝑗/|𝐶0 | |𝐶1 |, and the ward linkage is
∑
𝛿2𝑖 𝑗/|𝐶0 | |𝐶1 | (∀𝑃𝑖 ∈ 𝐶0 and ∀𝑃 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶1), where |𝐶0 | and |𝐶1 |
are sizes of the clusters.
3.4 Synthesizing faces
The goal of the synthesizing faces component is to generate synthe-
sized images for each cluster by combining all the 𝑘 images in the
corresponding cluster. In our system model, the synthesizing faces
component (Figure 1) is comprised of three modules: (1) Identity
mixing for combining identity vectors (i.e., latent vectors in the
Session 3: PETS in the Wild  WPES '20, November 9, 2020, Virtual Event, USA
90
case of GAN networks), (2) Generator for synthesizing image from
the mixed latent vector and (3) Re-identification risk assessment
for preventing face recognition.
Identity Mixing. The purpose of identity mixing module is to
generate one latent vector for each cluster by mixing the latent
vectors of all the identities in the corresponding clusters. The mixed
latent vector is required as input to the generator. The latent vec-
tor for each identity is generated based on the high-level features
extracted from the input image. For more details on embedding im-
age to StyleGAN’s latent space please refer to [1, 2]. Assuming we
are mixing identities of a cluster with 𝑘 members, each identity is















where𝑤𝑖 with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 is the weight value of a latent vector 𝐿𝑉𝑖 .
Initially, we set 𝐿𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑥 as the mean of all 𝐿𝑉𝑖 , in that case:𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝑘 .
(To avoid a deterministic output, the weights can already at this
point be universally randomizedwithinmargins, as described in Sec-
tion 3.4 for images with elevated risk of re-identification. We keep
the determinism here for reproducibility of the evaluation.) Note
that both the embeddings and the latent vectors can be computed
from the high-level features, however, they are used for different
purposes. The former is for the task of calculating deep similarity
metric between faces for clustering, while the latter is input for the
image generator.
Generator. The task of the generator module is generating one
synthesized image by combining 𝑘 images. The choice of generator
can have a significant impact on the efficacy of the de-identification
process. In our system model the generator can be chosen indepen-
dently. We experimented with three different generators: Active
Appearance Models (used in [10, 23, 29, 31]), Up-convolutional neu-
ral network [6] (used by 𝑘-same-net [22]), and StyleGAN[12]. In
the end, we chose StyleGAN due to its flexibility and performance.
One of the key benefits of StyleGAN is that it can generate synthe-
sized images of any unknown identities with a pre-trained network,
hence it does not need to be re-trained for every new dataset. In
contrast, 𝑘-same-net can only generate synthesized images of the
identities that it is trained on. Thus, it needs to be re-trained for
every new image and every new dataset, which is inefficient. In
addition, StyleGAN also provides us the flexibility to control the
non-identity related features such as age, gender, emotion, skin
color, camera angle, lighting, etc. of the generated synthesized im-
age which is not possible in 𝑘-same-net without extra additional
manual-parameters (e.g., face expression: happy, fear, sad). Lastly,
the naturalness of the synthesized images generated by StyleGAN
is better than the counterpart.
Re-identificationRiskAssessment.One of the problemswhile
using 𝑘-same family algorithms is that there is a possibility that the
synthesized face is biased towards one or more identities among
𝑘 original identities. In an ideal scenario, if we replace 𝑘 identities
with the same synthesized one then the re-identification probability
is 1/𝑘 . However, regardless of the choice of generator, there is still
bias while synthesizing an image. To tackle this, we introduce a
module in our system model for assessing and adjusting the re-
identification risk. In our case, we can easily measure the similarity
distance from the synthesized identity to the original ones. First,
using the similarity distances, we identify whether a synthesized
image is below a certain face-recognition threshold distance (e.g.,
0.6 in the case of Dlib-based face recognition; this varies for other
techniques) from any original identity. Once we detect such a risk,
the weights of the identities that are at risk are adjusted and the
mixed latent vector is re-calculated by Equation (1).
In particular, assuming that we are generating a synthesized im-
age𝐷𝑖 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ⌊𝑛/𝑘⌋ for a cluster𝐶𝑖 with𝑘 members {𝑚1, . . . ,𝑚𝑘 },
we first calculate the distances {𝛾1, . . . , 𝛾𝑘 } from𝐷𝑖 to {𝑚1, . . . ,𝑚𝑘 }.
By comparing the distances to the re-identification threshold, we
detect identities that are at risk and we denote their set as 𝑅 =
{𝑚𝑟1 , . . . ,𝑚𝑟𝑢 }, with 𝑢 being the size of the set of identities under
the threshold. The re-identification rate for this cluster is 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑢/𝑘 .
The weights of identities in 𝑅 are reduced by a factor 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
{𝑤𝑟1 − 𝛽, . . . ,𝑤𝑟𝑢 − 𝛽}. With these new weights, the mixed latent
vector is updated and a new synthesized image is generated. This
is repeated until 𝑢 = 0 and 𝑅 = {}.
3.5 Tuning
The process of image de-identification results in a trade-off between
privacy and utility. The relation between privacy and utility in the
case of image de-identification is nonlinear. Thus, to exploit this
relation and find good points in the trade-off between privacy
and utility, we repeat the de-identification process for different
values of privacy (the value 𝑘) and quantify the corresponding
utility (information loss). Based on the quantification, we look for
nonlinear effects to get recommendations for good values of 𝑘 that
add little information loss. We exemplify this process and other
ways of finding a good 𝑘 on two different datasets in the evaluation.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
4.1 Datasets and Experiment Environment
To evaluate AnonFACES, we use the Microsoft Azure Virtual Ma-
chine with a Standard NC6 configuration: E5-2690v3 Xeon CPU,
Tesla K80 GPU, and 56GB of RAM. Our code is available in a GitHub
repository1. For the datasets, we use two publicly available datasets
of face images, i.e., Radboud Faces Database (RaFD) [15] and Large-
scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) Dataset [20].
• RaFD: The RaFD dataset contains high-quality images of 67
subjects with eight different facial expressions (i.e., anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, contempt and neu-
tral) per subject. Furthermore, for each facial expression,
each subject is captured under three different gaze directions
and from five camera angles.
• CelebA: The CelebA dataset is a popular large-scale dataset
containing over 200𝑘 celebrity images, each with 40 attribute
annotations. The diverse images in this dataset cover 10,177
different identities, large pose variations, and include a rich
variation in background clutter.
Regarding the generator, we use StyleGAN [12]. Incorporating
StyleGAN into our experiments is straightforward since pre-trained
models are available for the two high-quality datasets FFHQ and
CelebHQ [25]. Whereas CelebHQ contains high-quality images of
1https://github.com/minha12/AnonFACES
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Figure 2: Comparing internal pair-wise distances on CelebA dataset with different algorithms: (Hierarchical Partition): aver-
age, complete and ward linkage; (𝑘-Means Partition): OTP [19], elki [3], random method; (kNN Partition): 𝑘-same clustering
[24], 𝑘member [4], max dist method. Here, we used 𝑘 = 20.
the same identities as CelebA, the FFHQ contain portrait images
of normal people on Flickr.com. For the StyleGAN experiments
presented in this section, we used the pre-trained models based on
the FFHQ dataset. This allows us to target a more realistic use case
in which a network is trained and applied on datasets containing
different identities.
4.2 Clustering Evaluation
Besides our proposed hierarchical partitioning algorithm, we im-
plemented other related works and grouped them according to
their relative algorithm, i.e., kNN Partition includes 𝑘-same clus-
tering [24], 𝑘member [4], and max dist method - a variance of
clustering used in 𝑘-same with maximum distance function for se-
lecting initial cluster centroids; 𝑘-means Partition includes elki [3]
and random method - a variance of elki with random selection as a
baseline comparison. To evaluate how well different clustering al-
gorithms group similar images, we calculate the minimum, average,
and maximum pair-wise distance within a cluster, as well as the
mean Silhouette scores. The results of the experiments performed
on CelebA dataset are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The choice of fo-
cusing on distance metrics within a cluster rather than cross-cluster
metrics is motivated by the observation that the internal distances
matter most for minimizing the information loss when combining
similar faces in a cluster. It matters much less how far apart the
faces in different clusters are separated.
Comparing the distance scores of the algorithms (Figure 2), we
observe a slight advantage for hierarchical partitioning in many
but not all cases, including when the best linkage criteria are used
(i.e., when combined with average or ward linkage the hierarchical
partitioning performs best on average). Note that for both Figures 2
and 3, we narrow down the y-axis to focus on the changes.
Considering the Silhouette scores (Figure 3), the hierarchical
partitioning again stands out as the winner in most cases and is
the only partitioning technique that achieves positive scores (again
when using average and ward linkage). A positive Silhouette score
means that similar faces are well situated in their cluster rather
than their nearest-neighbor cluster. These results indicate that for
Figure 3: Clustering evaluation: comparing average Silhou-
ette scores on CelebA dataset. Here, we used 𝑘 = 20.
CelebA dataset, hierarchical partitioning is best suited. While the
best method may differ for other datasets, the methodology de-
scribed here can easily be replicated to find the best algorithm also
for other datasets. Therefore, our methodology satisfies the desired
property for generality (E3).
4.3 Information Loss Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the improvements pro-
vided by AnonFACES as well as how the configurations at each
stage of the process affect the privacy-utility trade-off.
To capture the utility of the images generated by AnonFACES,
we first show its naturalness preservation capability and then, we
use the information loss metric to evaluate the information loss
attributed to some of the design choices made in the AnonFACES
design. For the latter part, we present a step-by-step analysis, taking
into account the information loss associated with three of the main
steps: embedding, clustering, and image generation.
Preserving Naturalness (E2). Preserving the naturalness of
de-identified image is the main focus of recent works [22, 26, 34]
on image de-identification. This aspect is difficult to measure by
embedding techniques since it is subjective to human observation.
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Figure 4: Naturalness preservation: (a) capability of AnonFACES to group similar faces and synthesize faces from different
camera angles, age groups, and skin tones (CelebA dataset), (b) comparison of 𝑘-Same-Net and AnonFACES (RafD dataset)
Figure 5: Comparison with AnonymousNet [17]: first row:
input images, second row: similar faces found using Anon-
FACES clustering, third row: results from [17], fourth row:
AnonFACES results
Although it has not much meaning for computer vision, some ap-
plications have high requirements in this regard, e.g., publishing de-
identified image datasets (the client requires that the de-identified
images should be indistinguishable from real images). In Figure 4(a),
some sample results show that AnonFACES can cluster and syn-
thesize faces from varying input conditions. Figure 4(b) compares
representative examples generated by 𝑘-Same-Net and AnonFACES
on the RafD dataset. As shown in the figure, while 𝑘-Same-Net is
unable to preserve much of the details and also could not generate
the hair properly, AnonFACES, thanks to instantiating the genera-
tor module with StyleGAN, provides better naturalness with a high
level of details, fulfilling Property E2.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 provide direct comparisons with three other
recent state-of-the-art solutions [17, 26, 29]. Here, we have used im-
ages that the other works have used in their papers as input images
Figure 6: Comparison with k-Same-Siamese-GAN [26]: first
row: input images, second row: similar faces found using
AnonFACES clustering, third row: results from [26], fourth
row: AnonFACES results
(top row), identified similar faces using the AnonFACES clustering
technique (second row), and then presented the results that from
the competing solutions (third row) and those from AnonFACES
(fourth row) with the two first images as input, with 𝑘=2.
Effect of Embeddings Extraction Method on Information
Loss (E1). First we show the effect of choice of embedding tech-
niques on the information loss. We compare the embeddings ex-
tracted from Dlib, FaceNet, and PCA - a traditional dimensionality-
reduction method (used in prior works [22ś24]). The experiment is
performed using hierarchical partitioning and StyleGAN generator
for both of the test cases. The results are shown in Figure 9(a) with
𝑘 values ranging from 2 to 20. In the figure, we can see a significant
difference between Dlib/FaceNet compared to PCA. For example,
the information loss when using 𝑘 = 3 with PCA is the same when
using 𝑘 = 9 with Dlib. This is a remarkable improvement, since
𝑘 = 9 provides much better privacy than 𝑘 = 3. The improvement
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Figure 7: Comparisonwith Samarzija et al. [29], AnonFACES
can preserve posewith higher image quality: first row: input
images, second row: similar faces found using AnonFACES
clustering, third row: results from [29], fourth row: Anon-
FACES results
reflects the property (S1) of the desired properties. Regarding rec-
ommendation of 𝑘 value for the Dlib case, the information loss
changed significantly with 𝑘 < 4 and 𝑘 > 6 indicating that 𝑘 = 5 or
𝑘 = 6 can be good choices for the given dataset.
Effect of Clustering on Information Loss (E1). This experi-
ment is performed using Dlib embeddings and StyleGAN generator
on the CelebA dataset. The result is shown in Figure 9(b). Un-
like the results in Section 4.2, the differences between 𝑘-means
(elki method), 𝑘NN (max dist method) and hierarchical partitioning
(ward linkage) are noticeable, with the latter slightly outperforming
the former for all the tested 𝑘 values. Furthermore, we observe from
the result that the 𝑘-means method fluctuates more compare to
the other methods. One possible reason behind the fluctuation of
𝑘-means can be its random choice of initial centroids. The combi-
nation of a good choice embeddings and clustering method also
have a visual impact on the clustering result. As shown in Figure 8,
we compare the clustering result of AnonFACES based on Dlib
embedding and hierarchical partitioning and the related works in-
cluding k-Same-M [10] and k-Same-Eigen [24]. The k-Same-M is
based on Active Appearance Models (AAM), k-NN partitioning (on
AAM’s features domain) while the k-Same-Eigen is based on PCA
embeddings and k-NN partitioning. We can see that k-Same-Eigen
mixed different genders and age groups when generating clusters
and k-Same-M mixed different genders (although it was better than
k-Same-Eigen at grouping people of the same age). In this sample,
the result of AnonFACES is better since it can group people of the
same age and gender. This is one of the examples showing that
even though the improvement of embeddings and clustering may
only be slight in terms of numerical results concerning information
loss and pair-wise distance (as shown in Figures 2, 3, 9), in terms of
attributes grouping the results are noticeable.
Figure 8: A sample of clusters (𝑘 = 4): the first column is
the query image; each row contains images from the same
cluster as the query. first row: AnonFACES, second row: k-
Same-M [10], third row: k-Same [24]
Effect of ImageGenerator on Information Loss (E1). In this
experiment, we use Dlib embeddings with hierarchical clustering
for comparing StyleGAN, generative up-convolutional neural net-
work [6] (used in 𝑘-same-Net [22]), and AAM generator (used in
[10, 23, 29, 31]). The up-convolutional network has the main limita-
tion that it requires the identity set used for training and testing to
be similar and it only works with a pre-defined number of identities,
going against Property E3. Thus, we are only able to perform the
experiment with a dataset consisting of a small set of identities. The
RafD dataset is chosen this time. As shown in Figure 9(c), except a
small different at 𝑘 = 2, StyleGAN has relatively lower information
loss than the up-convolutional network and significantly lower
than AAM generator in the range of chosen 𝑘 values. Beside that,
the result of the former is less stable compared to the other ones.
Note that due to limited space, we narrow down the y-axis of the
figures to focus on differences.
Finally, we show a numerical comparison between AnonFACES
and the related works in Figure 10. In this figure, we see that
AnonFACES found a balance between the information loss and
re-identification rate. In most of the cases, we can preserve bet-
ter information loss while having acceptable re-identification rate
below the 1/𝑘 threshold. We also include the random sampling
which is the experiment without any clustering method for the
upper-bound estimation. The lower bound depends on the choice
of embbeding-extractionmethod, in case of Dlib embeddings (which
is the one we mainly use for our evaluation metrics) it is 0.6. If
the result of average information loss is too close to or falls below
the threshold, it indicates that the de-identification algorithm is
very good at preserving information but also has a higher risk of
re-identification, which is the case of k-Same for low values of 𝑘
(𝑘 ≤ 4).
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Figure 9: Information loss at different stages: (a) embeddings on CelebA, (b) clustering on CelebA, (c) generator on RafD
Figure 10: Comparison to the related works on the RafD dataset
4.4 Tuning: How to choose the 𝑘 value?
AnonFACES provides several options to tune the privacy-utility
trade-off. The first option is based on the information loss met-
ric and the re-identification rate as demonstrated in the previous
section. For example, in Figure 10, the plateaus between 𝑘 equal
to 12 and 20 or 5-10 result in negligible information loss and one
can pick a higher 𝑘 at little cost, and the overall curve gets flatter
with higher 𝑘 values as shown in Figure 11. These metrics enable a
general analysis on the whole dataset, which mostly focuses on the
loss of information and the risk of re-identification corresponding
to each 𝑘 value. Here, non-linear relations can be exploited.
With a small dataset such as RafD, which include few identities,
we note that a visualization tool such as Dendrogram (see Figure 12)
can also be used to help select a good 𝑘 value. For example, by
drawing a horizontal line across the Dendogram, we can find a place
where the majority of data points (e.g. dashed-black horizontal line
in Figure 12) has at least one cluster and a line where the minority of
the data points has a cluster (e.g. dashed-magenta line in Figure 12).
The lowest and the highest cluster sizes at the cuts can then provide
approximate bounds for good 𝑘 values. In the current example,
at the lower cut, we have 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 2. This gives us clusters with
members very close to each other; however, many outliers will
need to be forced into their closest clusters. At the higher cut, we
have 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5. Here, the members are further away, but we have
fewer outliers. The outliers are handled as described in Algorithm 1.
The output after a single cut-tree is not the final output but it can
give us a look on how the distribution of the clusters after cutting,
hence an estimation for 𝑘 value.
Depending on use cases and applications, the definition of util-
ity can vary and the general metrics provided by us thus far are
suboptimal compared to when the specific analysis is known and
can inform which features to preserve. In those situations, we need
to provide a list of attributes in advance and observe the change
while the 𝑘 value varies. One of the approaches we have experi-
mented with AnonFACES is the homogeneity of attributes (note
that with the help of the advancement in computer vision and deep
learning, we have different tools for attributes extraction; this is
out of scope of this paper). Considering a cluster𝐶 with 𝑘 members,
each member has a list of𝑚-attributes 𝐴 = (𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑚). For each
attribute (𝑎𝑖 ) ∈ 𝐴 we calculate the entropy of that attribute for all
𝑘 members in the cluster. A 𝑎𝑖 -homogeneous cluster is one that has
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑎𝑖 = 0. For each 𝑘 value we find the rate of 𝑎𝑖 -homogeneous
clusters among all the clusters in the sampling dataset and observe
the change while varying 𝑘 . Figure 13 shows the example results
for the age and gender attributes of the RafD dataset. As seen in the
first two sub-figures, with 𝑘 = 2, more than 80% of the clusters are
homogeneous for both the attributes age and gender. With 𝑘 = 5,
the values rapidly reduce to around 70% for the case of age and to
60% for gender. Note that RafD is a very small dataset.
Similarly, we can define a (𝑎𝑖 , . . . , 𝑎 𝑗 )-homogeneous cluster, where
(𝑎𝑖 , . . . , 𝑎 𝑗 ) ∈ 𝐴, as the one that has 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑎𝑝 = 0, for all 𝑎𝑝 ∈
(𝑎𝑖 , . . . , 𝑎 𝑗 ). As shown in the last subfigure in Figure 13, we still
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Figure 11: Experiment with maximum 𝑘 = 100 on CelebA dataset
Figure 12: Dendrogram showing the hierarchical tree built
from a sample of the RafD dataset: y-axis denotes the dis-
tance between clusters and x-axis denotes the index of data
points in the dataset
have more than 70% of clusters that have both age and gender ho-
mogeneity with 𝑘 = 2; however, the value falls below 50% for 𝑘 = 6
before bounding back at around 60% for 𝑘 = 8. Obviously, achieving
multi-attribute homogeneity is more difficult comparing to single
ones. In such a case where we need to preserve both attributes at a
reasonable level (≥ 60%), 𝑘 ≤ 4 is required.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Newton et al. [24] consider an attacker that attempts to re-identify
a de-identified face set by using face recognition software. They
showed that traditional de-identification techniques such as pix-
elation, blurring, or masking some facial features are vulnerable
to such an attacker. As with their original 𝑘-same algorithm, we
need to show that the re-identification probability never exceeds
1/𝑘 to provide 𝑘-anonymity (Property S1). While this is trivially
true (and independent of how sophisticated face recognition be-
comes) considering that all faces belonging to a cluster of size 𝑘 are
replaced by the same synthesized face, generated from the 𝑘 faces
belonging to the cluster, facial-recognition matches could still give
the attacker additional knowledge or confirmations that could give
them an advantage when combined with side information and, thus,
resistance against facial recognition matches becomes necessary
(Property S2).
In line with Newton et al. [24], we define three attacker types,
depending on the images available to the attacker and what facial-
recognition matches could tell them. We refer to the terms gallery
and probe for the sets used during the attacks. The gallery is the
set of known faces in the facial-recognition software, i.e., G =
{G1, . . . ,Gu}, while the probe is the set of faces to recognize iden-
tities [35], i.e., P = {P1, . . . , Pv}. An attacker always has access
to face-recognition software as a re-identification tool. However,
whether they have knowledge about the probe or gallery set de-
pends on the specific attack scenario. We define re-identification as
a match between an element of the probe and one or more elements
of the gallery as returned by facial recognition.
In the naive recognition attack model, the attacker A1 tries to
match original images to de-identified (synthesized) images by
running the latter through face recognition but is not trying to
interfere in the de-identification process. The original images (and
any additional images), denoted by I = {I1, . . . , Is}, are used as the
gallery and the synthesized images, denoted by D = {D1, . . . ,Dt},
as the probe. Therefore, in this model, G ≔ I and P ≔ D.
In the reverse recognition attack model, the attacker A2 tries to
match synthesized images, i.e., the gallery, to original images. Thus,
P ≔ I and G ≔ D. The attacker has some additional knowledge:
the original dataset. 2
In the parrot recognition attack model, the attackerA3 attempts
to match synthesized images to synthesized images. This experi-
ment is performed by an attackerwho can duplicate de-identification
techniques and, therefore, is capable of de-identifying both gallery
and probe images. This results in a comparison of de-identified
images to de-identified images. Similar to the first attack model, the
gallerymight include more images than the ones being de-identified
in the probe.
5.1 Evaluation of the Re-identification Rate
Rank-1 analysis. For evaluating the facial recognition resistance
(S2) of AnonFACES, we conducted re-identification experiments
on the de-identified images. In these experiments, our goal is to
assess the risk of successful identification of a subject in the input
set 𝐼 based on the de-identified images in set 𝐷 . We assume that
the identities in input set 𝐼 are known and using face recognition
the task is to link the de-identified images in 𝐷 to the identities
in 𝐼 . The re-identification risk is quantified based on recognition
experiments on the person-specific CelebA [20] dataset as defined
in 3.1. We randomly selected 50 identities from the CelebA dataset
2"By using the altered images as the gallery, the alterations due to de-identification
may decompose and become dispersed through some number of principle components,
thereby limiting the affects of the alterations when matching faces."[24]
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Figure 13: Rate of homogeneous cluster based on attributes age, gender, or both age and gender
Figure 14: Pair-wise distance on CelebA, adjustment for re-
identification risk limited to 1/𝑘: (a) boxplot of distances
from original to synthesized faces, (b) average of pair-wise
distance per cluster.
during each experimental run and constructed a probe set for de-
identification which includes one image per identity. For the gallery
set, we use 10,177 images which include one image for each identity
in the probe set , different from the images used in the probe set.
We then perform identification experiments using the Dlib [14]
based python face recognition library and the constructed probe
and gallery sets. To assess the effect of the 𝑘 value, we repeat the
process for 𝑘 values 2, 4, and 8, when clustering the images of
the probe set. We then present the performance as average rank
one (Rank-1) recognition rates and the corresponding standard
deviation for each 𝑘 value over three experimental runs. The Rank-
1 recognition reveals whether for a given probe image the topmatch
in the gallery set identified by the face recognition is a correct match
or not. In other words, Rank-1 recognition is true if the probe image
and the top ranked image in the gallery set is of the same identity
and false otherwise. Note that in our experiments, we know which
identity was replaced by a given de-identified image. In an attack,
any of the 𝑘 identities in the same cluster would be a correct Rank-1
result, but with any 𝑘 greater than 1, successful re-identification
still does not tell an attacker whether the Rank-1 identity was in
the original image or only in the cluster of size 𝑘 that was used to
synthesize the de-identified image.
Definition 5.1. The Rank-1 recognition rate (RR) for a probe set
𝑃 can be formally defined as RR = 𝑅1/|𝑃 |, where 𝑅1 denotes the
number of probe images in gallery set 𝐺 that have been correctly
recognized as top-ranked and |𝑃 | is the size of the probe set.
Table 1 represents the Rank-1 recognition rate on the CelebA
dataset before and after de-identification. While the average Rank-1
Table 1: Recognitionperformance ofAnonFACESbefore and
after de-identification over three repetitions of recognition









𝑘=4 0.00667 ± 0.01155
𝑘=8 0 ± 0
recognition rate before de-identification for the randomly selected
identities of CelebA dataset is relatively low (around 78%) for this
selection, it still provides a substantial contrast to the much lower
Rank-1 recognition rates after de-identification. One possible reason
for low recognition rate before de-identification could be due to
the large gallery set and a very small probe set as pointed out in
[13]. In the case of de-identified images, even with the 𝑘=2, the
recognition rate reduces to 1.3%. This is well below the 2% achieved
by k-same-Net [22] in similar experiments. As we increased the
𝑘 value, the recognition rate decreased further. For example, with
𝑘=4 the average recognition rate is 0.67%, and with 𝑘=8 it is 0.0%.
Thus, the overall experimental evaluation suggests that the risk of
re-identification of images de-identified using AnonFACES is very
low, especially if using a larger 𝑘 value.
Naive and Reverse Recognition. Firstly, even though larger
datasets can potentially lead to better de-identification results, we
consider, for completeness, a dataset of the same size. In other
words, the gallery only includes de-identified images. We evaluate
attacks on both cluster level and database level:
• Cluster Level Evaluation. In Figure 14(a), we show a box-
plot of an example where a sample of 1000 identities in
CelebA dataset is used to cluster them into around 50 clus-
ters so that each cluster has at least 20 members. In this
figure, we can observe pair-wise distances from identities in
clusters to their de-identified ones. We expect that the boxes
are located in the middle of the boxplots and the median
lines are in the middle of the boxes, which is the case for
most of the clusters. Even though we still see some identities
fall below the re-identification line (red line), the average
pair-wise distances from the synthesized images to their
corresponding cluster members (Figure 14(b)) are above the
threshold for all clusters. In other words, cluster-wise, the
matching from original images to synthesized ones or vice
versa cannot be achieved, thwarting Attackers A1 and A2.
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Figure 15: Comparison of re-identification rates between dif-
ferent clustering algorithms: (a) CelebA dataset, (b) RafD
dataset
• Database Level Evaluation. Considering the whole data-
base (CelebA and RafD), we see how the re-identification
rates differ in Figures 15(a) and 15(b). As expected, the choice
of clustering has an impact on themetric and it is moremixed
for the case of RafD compared to CelebA. In these cases, we
see that although kNN performs slightly better, all the lines
are below the threshold of 1/𝑘 . Thus, our technique is secure
against both naive and reverse recognition tests with respect
to 𝑘-anonymity (S1). To avoid any matches (S2), we adjust
weights for identity mixing as described in Section 3.4.
Parrot Recognition. Among the three types of attacks, parrot
recognition is the most advanced. With this type, attackers can
have an advantage in breaking image de-identification algorithms,
especially the traditional ones such as pixelation and blurring are
at risk. The problem is that the existing approaches act as deter-
ministic functions, meaning that with the same input, we always
have the same result. By reverse engineering, making queries and
observing the outputs, the attacker can perform this kind of attack
even without the assumption that the de-identification algorithm
is revealed.
Although StyleGAN provides a deterministic output, we can still
introduce randomness to the identity-mixing process that provides
the input. Since randomness can affect information loss, it has
to be limited. We turn AnonFACES into a non-deterministic de-
identification algorithm with a constraint on entropy.
Previously, we set weights in Equation (1): 𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝑘 for all
𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑘], then change the weight according to re-identification
rates in the Risk Assessment module. Setting𝑤𝑖 to random is equal
to calculating 𝐿𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑥 randomly, which is not what we want. Thus,
we experiment with different setups of𝑤𝑖 to find a safety net for
applying a random function on 𝑤𝑖 . In this experiment, we are
interested in the magnitude of𝑤𝑖 rather than individual values, so
that we set 𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 𝛼 ∈ (0, 2), the range that
StyleGAN still produces realistic results. We define our random
function as selection of random values in uniform distribution of
(𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 −𝛿,𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 +𝛿), where 𝛿 is radius of the random range and
𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 is the mean of weight values.
Figure 16 shows the re-identification rate improvements achieved
by both a basic weight adjustment in the Risk Assessment module
(called "AnonFACES adjusted" in the figure) and when adding ran-
domness to𝑤𝑖 ("AnonFACES rand") compared to amore basic imple-
mentation ("AnonFACES w/o adjustments"). Here, we show results
for both (a) the information loss and (b) the re-identification proba-
bility when applied on the RafD dataset. The figure also shows clear
Figure 16: Effect of risk assessment and random weights on
RafD: (a) information loss, (b) re-identification rate
trade-off between improved re-identification rates versus somewhat
increased information loss that these privacy enhancements make.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented AnonFACES, its methodology and sys-
tem design, and compared its performance with other state-of-the-
art solutions. At the core of the design is a novel methodology
that helps us to, for the first time, quantify, improve, and tune the
privacy-utility trade-off using an information loss metric. Our sys-
tem evaluation demonstrates that the system meets the five design
goals outlined in Section 3.1. In particular, the system achieved
𝑘-anonymity (S1) and facial recognition resistance (S2), while op-
timizing utility by minimizing information loss (E1), producing
more natural looking de-identified images (E2), while also allow-
ing for much greater flexibility in how the images are depicted,
added, or removed (E3) than provided by prior work. By evaluat-
ing the system when applying different functions for each of the
different modules with each of the three system components, we
also provide insights into where some of the advantages arise for
an example dataset. For example, it is shown that careful feature
extraction (embedding) before applying the clustering, can signifi-
cantly improve the clustering of similar images; an aspect mostly
ignored in prior 𝑘-anonymity work. However, most importantly,
the use of the quantifiable metrics that we introduce allows us
to exploit any non-linear relations between privacy and utility to
improve privacy or utility at limited loss of the other. We focused
on a general notion of utility that does not prioritize the preser-
vation of specific attributes over others and is thus suitable for
the analysis-agnostic case. When it is known in advance which
attributes are more important than others, the utility quantifica-
tion can be adapted accordingly. Overall, the findings in this work
demonstrate that solutions such as AnonFACES should allow the
generation of highly privacy-preserving datasets without having to
give up too much utility. This is important as it allows, for example,
car manufacturers to effectively train their autonomous vehicles
while complying with privacy laws.
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Appendix A ADDITIONAL COMPARISONS OF
VISUAL RESULTS WITH
RELATEDWORKS
In this appendix we compare visual results of AnonFACES with
recent results from [18] and [7]. As demonstrated in Figure 17,
the results in [18] have a blurring effect which reduces the image
quality while some identity features (e.g. general facial landmark)
are still similar. AnonFACES clearly outperforms [18] in terms
of naturalness and has a noticeably better anonymizing effect. In
Figure 18 the results from [7] are shown to have minimal difference
in terms of identity features such as general facial landmark features,
eyes, and mouth area. AnonFACES again provides visibly better
anonymization. In both cases, our results still preserve non-identity
information such as emotion, age, gender, and skin color. Note,
however, that [18] and [7] only replace some (identifying) facial
features, presumably to work with videos, whereas AnonFACES
replaces the entire image. Restricting the area to within the face
would allow for a more direct comparison but is outside of the
scope of this paper.
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Figure 17: Comparison with Li et al. [18]: first row: input im-
ages, second row: results from [18], third row: AnonFACES
results using 𝑘=2
Figure 18: Comparison with Gafni et al. [7]: first row: input
images, second row: results from [7], third row: AnonFACES
results using 𝑘=2
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